170 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XvI. 7 
and scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here placed 
with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty 
things; yet to such as have chosen them to spend their 
_ labours and studies in them, they seem great matters. 
XVII. 1. For the method of tradition, I see it hath 
moved a controversy in our time. But as in civil busi- 
ness, if there be a meeting, and men fall at words, there 
is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and no 
proceeding at all; so in learning, where there is much 
controversy, there is many times little inquiry. For this 
part of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly 
inquired as I shall report it deficient. 
2. Method hath been placed and that not amiss, in 
logic, as a part of judgement. For as the doctrine of 
syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgement upon 
that which is invented, so the doctrine of method con- 
taineth the rules of judgement upon that which is to be 
delivered ; for judgement precedeth delivery, as it follow- 
eth invention. Neither is the method or the nature of 
the tradition material only to the use of knowledge, but 
likewise to the progression of knowledge : for since the 
labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of 
knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which in- 
spireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And 
therefore the most real diversity of method is of method 
referred to use, and method referred to progression: 
whereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other 
of probation. 
3. The latter whereof seemeth to be wza deserta et inter- 
clusa. For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a 
kind of contract of error between the deliverer and the 
receiver. For he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to 
deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not 
