eee ee et ee re ey 
XVIL.12.] ‘THE SECOND BOOK. 198 
’ ’ 
12. But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, 
doth further belong not only the architecture of the whole 
frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns 
thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and 
figure. And therefore method considereth not only the 
disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the 
propositions: not as to their truth or matter, but as to 
their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus merited 
better a great deal in reviving the good rules of proposi- 
tions, Ka6dXov mp@rov, kara mavrés &c., than he did in intro- 
ducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the 
condition of human things that, according to the ancient 
fables, the most precious things have the most pernicious 
keepers) it was so, that the attempt of the one made him 
fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted 
that should design to make axioms convertible, if he 
make them not withal circular, and non-promovent, or 
incurring into themselves; but yet the intention was 
excellent. Ea 
13. The other considerations of¢method) concerning 
ropositions, are chiefly touching the utmost proposi- 
tions, which limit the dimensions of sciences: for every 
knowledge) may be fitly said, besides the profundity 
(which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it 
solid), to have a longitude and a latitude; accounting 
the latitude towards other sciences, and. the longitude 
towards action; that is, from the greatest generality to 
the most particular precept. The one giveth rule how 
r one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the pro-_ 
vince of another, which is the rule they call KaOauré ; the 
other giveth Tulé unto what degree of particularity a 
knowledge should descend: which latter I find passed 
over in silence, being in my judgement the more material. 
