se a nts ie 
‘XVIII. 4.] THE SECOND BOOK. 179 
reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence 
of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination 
from the affections’ part, and contract_a confederacy be- | ~— 
tween the'zesson and imagination against the affections ;/” 
for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to 
good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the affection 
beholdeth merely the present ; reason-beholdeth the future 
and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the 
imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but 
after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made 
: nn | 
things future and remote appear as present, t then _ upon 2 
the revol€“Of the imagination reason prevaileth. : Ue 
5. We conclude therefore that rhetoric can be no 
more charged with the colouring of the worse part, than 
logic with sophistry, or morality with vice. For we know 
the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use 
be opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from 
rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close, 
the other at large; but much more in this, that Togic) 
handleth reason exact and in truth, and Ghetoric handleth \ 
it as it is planted in in popular opinions and manners. And 
therefore Aristotle doth wisely place thetoric as between <- 
logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on ‘Ye 
the other, as participating of both: for the proofs and | 
demonstrations of logic are toward all men indifferent 
and the same; but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ) 
ought to differ according to the auditors : /} 
a 
Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion. 
Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to_extend 
so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to 
several persons, he should speak to them all respectively 
and several ways: though this politic part of eloquence 
N 2 
