_ = ee ae, ve! See 
196 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXI. 3. _ 
man’s nature may not be capable of both, is a question 
not inquired. 
4. The former question being debated between Socrates 
and a sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and 
constant peace of mind, and the sophist in much de- 
siring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill 
words: the sophist saying that Socrates’ felicity was the 
felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying that 
the sophist’s felicity was the felicity of one that had the 
itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both 
these opinions do not want their supports. For the 
opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general con- 
sent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue bear- 
eth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that 
virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations than 
in compassing desires. The sophist’s opinion is much 
favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good of 
advancement is greater than good of simple preservation ; 
because every obtaining a desire hath a show of advance- 
ment, as motion though in a circle hath a show of pro- 
gression. 
5. But the second question, decided the true way, 
maketh the former superfluous. For can it be doubted, 
but that there are some who take more pleasure in en- 
joying pleasures than some other, and yet, nevertheless, 
are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them? So 
as this same, JVon uit ut non appetas, non appetere ut non 
metuas, sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis. And it seemeth 
to me, that most of the doctrines of the philosophers are 
more fearful and cautionary than the nature of things 
requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in 
offering to cure it. For when they would have a man’s 
whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, 
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