XXII. 4.] THE SECOND BOOK. 205 
of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or com- 
mixture ; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in 
passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, 
that can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be 
considered, that there are minds which are proportioned 
to great matters, and others to small (which “Aristotle 
handleth or ought to have handled by the name of 
magnanimity), doth it not deserve as well to be con- 
sidered, that there are minds proportioned to intend many 
matters, and others to few? So that some can divide 
themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it 
must be but in few things at once: and so there cometh 
to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. 
And again, that some minds are proportioned to that 
which may be dispatched at once, or within a short 
return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and 
is to be won with length of pursuit : 
Jam tum tenditque fovetque, \) 
So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which 
is commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So 
further deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, Zhaz 
there is a disposition in conversation (supposing it in things 
which do in no sort touch or concern a man’s self) to soothe 
and please; and a disposition contrary to contradict and 
cross: and deserveth it not much better to be considered, 
That there ts a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but 
in matter of more serious nature (and supposing it still in 
things merely indifferent), to take pleasure in the good of 
another: and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at 
the good of another? which is that properly which we call 
good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity: and 
therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of 
knowledge, touching the several characters of natures 
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