i 
a) Se 
XXII.10.] ‘TEE SECOND BOOK. 211 
posed, the other when it is worst disposed; that by the 
one you may gain a great step, by the other you may 
work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make 
the middle times the more easy and pleasant. 
11. Another precept is, that which Aristotle men- 
tioneth by the way, which is to bear ever towards the 
contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature 
inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or 
making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his 
natural crookedness. 
12. Another precept is, that the mind is brought to 
anything better, and with more sweetness and happiness, 
if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, 
but Zanquam aliud agendo, because of the natural hatred of 
the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other 
axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and 
custom; which being so conducted, doth prove indeed 
another nature; but being governed by chance, doth 
commonly prove but an ape of nature, and bringeth forth 
that which is lame and counterfeit. 
13. So if we should handle books and studies, and 
what influence and operation they have upon manners, 
are there not divers precepts of great caution and direc- 
tion appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers 
in great indignation call poesy wnum demonum, because 
it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? 
Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, 
wherein he saith, That young men are no fit auditors of 
moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the 
boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time 
and experience? And doth it not hereof come, that those 
excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers 
(whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, 
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