NATIONAL FOREST MANUAL LAWS. 73 



While it is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power 

 to make laws and administrative authority to make regulations, Con- 

 gress may delegate power to fill up details where it has indicated its 

 will in the statute, and it may make violations of such regulations 

 punishable as indicated in the statute; and so held that regulations 

 made by the Secretary of Agriculture as to grazing sheep on forest 

 reserves have the force of law and that violations thereof are punish- 

 able, under act of June 4, 1897, chapter 2 (30 Stat., 35), as prescribed 

 in section 5388, Revised Statutes. 



Congress can not delegate legislative power (Field v. Clark, 143 

 U. S., 692), but the authority to make administrative rules is not a 

 delegation of legislative power, and such rules do not become legisla- 

 tion because violations thereof are punished as public offenses. 



Even if there is no express act of Congess making it unlawful to graze 

 sheep or cattle on a forest reserve, when Congress expressly provides 

 that such reserves can only be used for lawful purposes subject to regu- 

 lations and makes a violation of such regulations _an offense, any exist- 

 ing implied license to graze is curtailed and qualified by Congress; and 

 one violating the regulations when promulgated makes an unlawful use 

 of the Government's property and becomes subject to the penalty 

 imposed. 



A provision in an act of Congress as to the use made of moneys 

 received from Government property clearly indicates an authority to the 

 executive officer authorized by statute to make regulations regarding 

 the property to impose a charge for its use. 



Where the penalty for violations of regulations to be made by an 

 executive officer is prescribed by statute, the violation is not made a 

 crime by such officer but by Congress, and Congress and not such 

 officer fixes the penalty, nor is the offense against such officer, but 

 against the United States. (Same.) 



[Light v. United States, 220 U. S., 523, syllabus.] 



Congress may authorize an executive officer to make rules and regu- 

 lations as to the use, occupancy, and preservation of forests and such 

 authority so granted is not unconstitutional as a delegation of legis- 

 lative power. (Following United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S., 506.) 



At common law the owner was responsible for damage done by his 

 live stock on land of third parties, but the United States has tacitly 

 suffered its public domain to be used for cattle so long as such tacit 

 consent was not canceled, but no vested rights have been conferred on 

 any person, nor has the United States been deprived of the power of 

 recalling such implied license. 



While the full scope of section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution has 

 never been definitely settled it is primarily a grant of power to the 

 United States of control over its property (Kansas v. Colorado, 206 

 U. S., 89); this control is exercised by Congress to the same extent that 

 an individual can control his property. 



It is for Congress and not for the courts to determine how the public 

 lands shall be administered. 



Congress has power to set apart portions of the public domain and 

 establish them as forest reserves and to prohibit the grazing of cattle 

 thereon or permit it subject to rules and regulations. 



Fence laws may condone trespasses by straying cattle where the laws 

 have not been complied with, but they do not authorize wanton or 

 willful trespass, nor do they afford immunity to those willfully turning 

 cattle loose under circumstances showing that they were intended to 

 graze upon the lands of another. 



Where cattle are turned loose under circumstances showing that the 

 owner expects and intends that they shall go upon a reserve to graze 

 thereon, for which he has no permit and he declines to apply for one, 

 and threatens to resist efforts to have the cattle removed and contends 

 that he has a right to have his cattle go on the reservation, equity has 

 jurisdiction, and such owner can be enjoined at the instance of the 

 Government, whether the land has been fenced or not. 



Quaere, and not decided, whether the United States is required to 

 fence property under laws of the State in which the property is located. 



