40 APPLICATION OF THE 



were substances accidentally configurated, which he had 

 picked up, and converted to his use ; that his adzes, saws, 

 planes and gimlets, were not made, as we suppose, to hew, 

 cut, smooth, shape out, or bore wood with ; but that these 

 things being made, no matter with what design, or whether 

 with any, the cabinet-maker perceived that they were ap- 

 plicable to his purpose, and turned them to account. 



But, again ; so far as this solution is attempted to be ap- 

 plied to those parts of animals, the action of which does 

 not depend upon the will of the animal, it is fraught with 

 still more evident absurdity. Is it possible to believe that 

 the eye was formed without any regard to vision ; that it 

 was the animal itself Vvhich found out, that, though formed 

 Avith no such intention, it would serve to see with ; and 

 that the use of the eye, as an organ of t^ight, resulted from 

 this discovery, and the animal's application of it? The same 

 question may be asked of the ear ; the same of all the 

 senses. None of the senses, fundamentally, depend upon 

 the election of the animal ; consequently, neither upon his 

 sagacity nor his experience. It is the impression which 

 objects make upon them that constitutes their use. Under 

 that impression he is passive. He may bring objects to the 

 sense, or w ithin its reach ; he may select these objects ; but 

 over the impression itself he has no power, or very little ; 

 and that properly is the sense. 



Secondly, there are many parts of animal bodies which 

 seem to depend upon the will of the animal in a greater 

 degree than the senses do, and yet with respect to which 

 this solution is equally unsatisfactory. If we apply the so- 

 lution to the human body for instance, it forms itself into 

 questions upon which no reasonable mind can doubt : such 

 as, w^hether the teeth were made expressly for the mastica- 

 tion of food, the feet for w^alking, the hands for holding ; 

 or w hether, these things being as they are, being in fact 

 in the animal's possession, his own ingenuity taught him 

 that they were convertible to these purposes, though no 

 such purposes w^ere contemplated in their formation. " 



All that there is of the appearance of reason in this 

 way of considering the subject is, that, in some cases, 

 the organization seems to determine the habits of the ani- 

 mal, and its choice, to a partictilar mode of life ; which, 

 in a certain sert.se, may be called " the use arising cut of 

 the part." Now to all the instances, in wliich there is any 

 place for this suggestion, it may be replied, that the organ- 

 ization determines the animal to habits beneficial and salu- 



