ARGUMENT CONTIUED. 41 



tavy to itself; and that this effect would not be seen so 

 regularly to follow, if the several organizations did not 

 bear a concerted and contrived relation to the substances 

 by which the animal was surrounded. They would, other- 

 wise, be capacities without objects ; powers without em- 

 ployment. TiiS web foot determines, you say, the duck 

 to swim : but what would that avail, if there vrere no water 

 to swim in? The strong, hooked bill, and sharp talons, 

 of one species of bird, determine it to prey upon animals; 

 the soft straight bil), and weak claws of another species, 

 determine it to pick up seeds : but neither determination 

 could take elfect in providing for the sustenance of the 

 birds, if animal bodies and vegetable seeds did not lie v/ith- 

 in their reach. The peculiar conformation of the bill, and 

 tongue, and claws of the woodpecker, determines that bird 

 to search for his food amongst the insects lodcred behind the 

 bark, or in the wood, of decayed trees ; but what would this 

 profit him if there were no trees, no decayed trees, no insects 

 lodged under their bark, or in their trunk 1 The proboscis 

 with which the bee is furnished, determines him to seek 

 for honey ; but what would that signify, if flowers supplied 

 none? Faculties thrown down upon animals at random, 

 and without reference to the objects amidst which they are 

 placed, v^ould not produce to them the services and benefits 

 which we see ; and if there be that reference, then there 

 is intention. 



Lastly, the solution fails entirely when applied to plants. 

 The parts of plants answer their uses, without any concur- 

 rence from the will or choice of the plant. 



VI. Others have chosen to refer every thing to a prin- 

 ciple of order in nature. A principle of order is the word ; 

 but what is meant by a principle of order, as different 

 from an intelligent Creator, has not been explained either 

 by definition or example ; and, without such explanation, 

 it should seem to be a mere substitution of words for rea- 

 sons, names for causes. Order itself is only the adaptation 

 of means to an end ; a principle of order, therefore, can 

 only signify the mind and intention which so adapts them. 

 Or were it capable of being explained in any other sense, 

 is there any experience, any analogy to sustain it? Was 

 a watch ever produced by a principle of order ? and why 

 might not a watch be so produced as well as an eye ? 



Furthermore, a principle of order, acting blindly and 

 without choice, is negatived by the observation, that order 

 E 



