THE ARGUMENT CUMULATIVE. 43 



should be inclined to doubt, or ought to doubt, about the 

 construction of a telescope, viz. for what purpose it was 

 constructed, or whether it were constructed at all, because 

 there belonged to it certain screws and pins, the use or 

 action of which we did not comprehend. I take it to be a 

 general way of infusing doubts and scruples into the mind, 

 to recall to it its own ignorance, its own imbecility ; to tell 

 us that upon these subjects we know little , that little im- 

 perfectly ; or rather, that we know nothing properly about 

 the matter. Tliese suggestions so fall in with our con- 

 sciousnesses, as sometimes to produce a general distrust of 

 our faculties and our conclusions. But this is an unfound- 

 ed jealousy. The uncertainty of one thing, does not 

 necessarily affect the certainty of another thing. Our ig- 

 norance of many points need not suspend our assurance of 

 a few. Before we yield, in any particular instance, to the 

 scepticism which this sort of insinuation would induce, we 

 ought accurately to ascertain, whether our ignorance or 

 doubt concern those precise points upon which our conclu- 

 sion rests. Other points are nothing. Our ignorance of 

 other points may be of no consequence to these ; though 

 they be points, in various respects, of sjreat importance. 

 A just reasoner removes from his consideration, not only 

 what he knows, but what he does not know, touching mat- 

 ters not strictly connected with his argument, i. e. not 

 forming the very steps of his deduction ; beyond these, 

 his knowledge and his ignorance are alike irrelative. 



CHAPTER VT. 



THE ARGUMENT CUMULATIVE. 



Were there no example in the world of contrivance ex- 

 cept that of the ei/e, it would be alone sufficient to support 

 the conclusion which we draw from it, as to the necessity 

 of an intelligent Creator. It could never be got rid of ; 

 because it could not be accounted for by any other suppo- 

 sition, which did not contradict all the principles we pos- 

 sess of knowledge : the principles according to which, 

 things do, as often as they can be brought to the test of ex- 

 perience, turn out to be true or false. Its coats and hu- 

 mours, constructed, as the lenses of a telescope are con-. 

 Biructed; for the refraction of rays of light to a point, which 



