^36 OP THE PERSONALITY OF THE DEITV. 



properties, but by a kind and class "of properties, such n^ 

 relation to an end, relation of parts to one another, and to 

 a common purpose. We see, vviierever we are witnesses 

 to the actual formation of things, nothing except intelli- 

 gence producing effects so marked and distinguished. Fur- 

 nished with this experience, we view the productions of 

 nature. We observe them also marked and distinguished 

 in the same manner. We wish to account for their origin. 

 Our experience suggests a cause perfectly adequate to this 

 account. No experience, no single instance or example, 

 can be offered in favour of any other. In this cause, there- 

 fore, we ought to rest , in this cause the common sense of 

 mankind has, in fact, rested, because it agrees with that 

 which in all cases is the foundation of knowledge, the un- 

 deviating course of their experience. The reasoning is 

 the same as that by which we conclude any ancient 

 appearances to have been the effects of volcanoes or inun- 

 dations ; namely, because they resemble the effects which 

 fire and water produce before our eyes ; and because we 

 have never known these effects to result from any other op- 

 eration. And this resemblance may subsist in so many 

 circumstances, as not to leave us under the smallest doubt 

 in forming our opinion. Men are not deceived by this rea- 

 soning ; for w^henever it happens, as it sometimes does hap- 

 pen, tiiat the truth comes to be known by direct informa- 

 tion, it turns out to be what was expected. In like man- 

 ner, and upon the same foundation, (which in truth is that 

 of experience,) we conclude that the works of nature pro- 

 ceed from intelligence and design, because, in the proper- 

 ties of relation to a purpose, subserviency to a use, they 

 resemble wiiat intelligence and design are constantly pro- 

 ducing, and what nothing except intelligence and design 

 ever produce at all. Of every argument which would 

 raise a question as to the safety of this reasoning, it may be 

 observed, that, if such argument be listened to, it leads to 

 the inference, not only that the present order of nature is 

 insufficient to prove the existence of an intelligent Creator, 

 but that no imaginable order would be sufficient to prove 

 it , that no contrivance, were it ever so mechanical, ever 

 so precise, ever so clear, ever so perfectly like those which 

 we ourselves employ, would support this conclusion. A 

 doctrine to which, I conceive, no sound mind can assent. 



The force, however, of the reasoning is sometimes sunk 

 by our taking up with mere names. We have already no^. 



