•J3S OF THE PERSONALITY OF THE DEITY. 



proof of contrivance, and of a contriving mind, having been 

 employed about it. In the form and obvious relation of its 

 parts we see enough to convince us of this. If we pull 

 the works in pieces, for the purpose of a closer examination^ 

 we are still more fully convinced. But, when we see the 

 watch going, we see proof of another point, viz. that there 

 is a power somewhere, and somehow or other applied to 

 it , a power in action ; that there is more in the subject 

 than the mere wheels of the machine ; that there is a 

 secret spring or a gravitating plummet; in a word, that 

 there is force and energy, as v/ell as mechanism. 



So, then, the watch in motion establishes to the observer 

 two conclusions : one — that thought, contrivance, and de- 

 sign, have been employed in forming, proportioning, and 

 arranging of its parts ; and that, whoever, or wherever he 

 be, or were, such a contriver there is, or was : the other — 

 that force or power, distinct from mechanism, is, at this 

 present time, acting upon it. If I saw a hand-mill, even at 

 rest, I should see contrivance ; but, if I saw it grinding, I 

 should be assured that a hand was at the windlass, though 

 in another room. It is the same in nature. In the works 

 of nature we trace mechanism; and this alone proves con- 

 trivance ; but living, active, moving, productive nature, 

 proves also the exertion of a power at the centre ; for, 

 wherever the pov/er resides^ may be denominated the 

 centre. 



The intervention and disposition of what arc called 

 " second causes" fall under the same observation. This 

 disposition is or is not mechanism, according as we can or 

 cannot trace it by our senses, and means of examination. 

 That is all the difference there is; and it is a difference 

 v.hich respects our faculties, not the things themselves. 

 Now where the order of second causes is mechanical, what 

 is here said of mechanistn strictly applies to it. But it 

 would be always mechanism, (natural chemistry, for in- 

 stance, would be mechanism,) if our senses were acute 

 enough to descry it. Neither mechanism, therefore, in 

 the woiks of nature, nor the intervention of what are call- 

 ed second causes, (for I think that they are the same 

 thing, j excuses tlie necessity of an agent distinct from both. 



If, in tracing these causes, it be said, that we find cer- 

 tain general properties of matter, which have nothing in 

 them that bespeaks intelligence, I answer, that, still, the 

 managing of these properties, the pointing and directing 

 them to the uses which we see made of them, demands in- 



