THE GOODNESS OP THE DEITY. 271 



not of that opinion. They afford a share of enjoyment to 

 man ; but to brutes, I believe, that they are of very great 

 iraportaiice. A horse at liberty passes a great part of his 

 waking hours in eating. To the ox, the sheep, the deer, 

 and other ruminating animals, the pleasure is doubled. 

 Their whole time almost is divided between browsing upon 

 their pasture and chewing their cud. Whatever the pleas- 

 ure be, it is spread over a large portion of their existence. 

 If there be animals, such as the lupous tish, which swallow 

 their prey whole, and at once, without any time, as it should 

 seem, for either drawing out, or relishing, the taste in the 

 mouth, is it an improbable conjecture, that the seat of taste 

 with them is m the stomach ; or, at least, that a sense of 

 pleasure, whether it be taste or not, accompanies the disso- 

 Iuti(>n of the food in that receptacle, which dissolution in 

 general is carried on very slowly ? If this opinion be right, 

 they are more than repaid for their defect of palate. The 

 feast lasts as long as the digestion. 



In seekincT for argument we need not stay to insist upon 

 the comparative importance of our example ; for the observa- 

 tion holds equally of all, or of three at least, of the other 

 senses. The necessary purposes of hearing might have 

 been answered without harmony ; of smell, without fra- 

 grance ; of vision, withmit beauty. Now, " If the Deity 

 had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we must 

 impute to our2:ood fortune (as all design by this supposition 

 is excluded) both the capacity of our senses to receive pleas- 

 ure, and the supply of external objects fitted to excite it." 

 I allege these as two felicities, for they are different things, 

 yet both necessary ' the sense being formed, the objects 

 which v/ere applied to it, might not have suited it ; the ob- 

 jects being fixed, the sense might not have agreed with them. 

 A coincidence is here required which no accident can ac- 

 count for. There are tiiree possible suppositions upon the 

 subject, and no more. The first, that the sense, by its original 

 constitution, was made to suit the object ; the second, that the 

 object, by original constitution, was made to suit the sense : 

 the third, that the sense is so constituted, as to be able, either 

 universally, or within certain limits, by habit and familiar- 

 ity to render every object pleasant. Whichever of these 

 suppositions we adopt, the effect evinces, on the part of the 

 Author of nature, a studious benevolence. If the pleasures 

 which we derive from any of our senses, depend upon an 

 original congruity between the sense and the properties 

 perceived by it, we know by experience, that the adjust- 



