'274 THE GOODNirsS OP THE PEIi^V. 



I do not know whether our attachment to properly (m; 

 not something more than the mere dictate of reason, or even 

 than the mere effect of association. Property communi- 

 cates a charm to whatever is the object of it. It is the first 

 of our abstract ideas ; it cleaves to us the closest and the 

 longest. It endears to the child its plaything, to the peas- 

 ant his cottage, to the landholder his estate. It supplies 

 the place of prospect and scenery. Instead of coveting the 

 beauty of distant situations, it teaches every man to find it 

 in his own. It gives boldness and grandeur to plains and 

 fens, tinge and colouring to clays and fallows. 



All these considerations come in aid of our second prop- 

 osition. The reader will now bear in mind what our two 

 propositions were. They were, firstly, that, in a vast plu- 

 rality of instances, in which contrivance is perceived, the 

 design of the contrivance is beneficial : secondly, that the 

 Deity has added pleasure to animal sensations beyond what 

 was necessary for any other purpose ; or when the purpose, 

 £0 far as it was necessary, might have been effected by the 

 operation of pain. 



Whilst these propositions can be maintained, we are au- 

 thorized to ascribe to the Deity the character of benevo- 

 lence : and what is benevolence at all, must in him be in-' 

 finite benevolence, by reason of the infinite, that is to say, 

 the incalculably great number of objects, upon which it i? 

 exercised. 



Of the opaoiN of evil no universal solution has been 

 discovered : I mean no solution which reaches to all cases 

 of complaint. The most comprehensive is that which 

 arises from the consideration of general rules. We may, I 

 think, without much difficulty, be brought to admit the four 

 following points : first, that important advantages may ac- 

 crue to the universe from the order of nature proceeding ac- 

 cording to general laws : secondly, that general laws, how- 

 ever well set and constituted, often thwart and cross one 

 another : thirdly, that from these thwartings and crossings 

 frequent particular inconveniences will arise : and fourth- 

 ly, that it agrees with our observation to suppose, that 

 some degree of these inconveniences takes place in the 

 works of nature. These points may be allowed ; and it 

 may also be asserted that the general laws with which we 

 yre acquainted, are directed to beneficial ends. On the 

 other hand, with many of these laws we are not acquaint- 

 ed at all, or we are totally unable to trace them in their 



