THE 600DNESS OP THE »EITT?. 375 



feraaehes and in their operation : the effect of which igno^ 

 ranee is, that they cannot be of importance to us as meas.- 

 ures by which to regulate our conduct The conservation 

 of them may be of importance in other respects, or to other 

 bemgs, but we are uninformed of their value or use : unin* 

 formed consequently when, and how far, they may or may not 

 be suspended, or their effects turned aside, uy a presiding and 

 benevolent will, without iccurrnig greater evils than those 

 xvhich would be avoided. The consideration, therefore, of 

 general laws, although it may concern the question of the 

 origin of evil very nearly, (which 1 think it does,) rests in 

 views disproportionate to our faculties, and in a knowledge 

 which we do not possess. It serves rather to account for the 

 obscurity of the subject, than to supply us with distinct an- 

 !?wers to our difficulties. However, whilst we assent to the 

 above stated propositions as principles, v/hatever uncertain- 

 ty we may iind in the application, we lay a ground for be- 

 lieving, that cases, of apparent evil, for which ive can sug- 

 gest no particular reason, are governed by reasons, which 

 are more general, which lie deeper in the order of second 

 causes, and which on that account are removed to a greater 

 distance from us. 



The doctrine oi imperfections, or, as it is called, of evils 

 of imperfection, furnishes an account, founded like the 

 former, in views of universal nature. The doctrine is 

 briefly this. It is probable that creation may be better re- 

 plenished, by sensitive beings of different sorts, than by 

 sensitive beings all of one sort. It is likewise probable, that 

 it may be better replenished, by different orders of beings 

 rising one above another in gradation, than by beings pos- 

 sessed of equal degrees of perfection. Now a gradation of 

 such beings implies a gradation of imperfections. No class 

 can justly complain of the imperfections wiiich belong to its 

 place in the scale, unless it were allowable for it to com- 

 plain, that a scale of being was appointed in nature : for 

 which appointment there appear to be reasons of wisdom 

 and goodness. 



In like mdiUUQx,Jinitcness, or what is resolvable into finite- 

 ness, in inanimate subjects, can never be a just subject of 

 complaint, because, if it were ever so, it would be always 

 so : we mean, that we can never reasonably demand that 

 things should be larger or more, when the same demand 

 might be made, whatever the quantity or number was. 



And to me it seems, that the sense of mankind has so 

 far acquiesced in these reasons, as that we seldom complain 



