THE GOODNESS OP THE DEITP, 285 



filing to London. Their meeting is by chance, is acciden- 

 tal, and so would be called and reckoned, though the jour- 

 neys which produced the meeting, were both of them, un- 

 dertaken with design and from deliberation. The meeting, 

 though accidental, was nevertheless hypotheticaily necessa- 

 ry, (which is the only sort of necessity that is intelligible ;) 

 for, if the two journeys were commenced at the time, pur- 

 sued in the direction, and with the speed, in which and 

 with which they were in fact begun and performed, the 

 meeting could not be avoided. There was not, therefore, 

 the less necessity in it for its being by chance. Again, 

 the meeting n^ight be the most unfortunate, though the er- 

 rands, upon winch each party set out upon his journey, 

 were the most innocent or the most laudable. The by 

 effect may be unfavourable, without impeachment of the 

 proper purpose, for the sake of which, the train, from the 

 operation of which these consequences ensued, was put in 

 motion. Although no cause act without a good purpose, 

 accidental consequences, like these, may be either good or 

 bad. 



IT. The appearance of chance w^ll always bear a pro- 

 portion to the ignorance of the observer. The cast of a 

 die, as regularly follows the laws of motion, as the going of 

 a watch ; yet, because we can trace the operation of those 

 laws through the works and movements of the watch, and 

 cannot trace them in the shaking and throwing of the die, 

 (though the laws be the same, and prevail equally in both 

 cases,) we call the turning up of the number of the die, 

 chance, the pointing of the index of the watch, machinery, 

 order, or by some name which excludes chance. It is the 

 same in those events which depend upon the will of a free 

 and rational agent. The verdict of a jury, the sentence of 

 a judge, the resolution of an assembly, the issue of a con- 

 tested election, will have more or less of the appearance of 

 chance, mig'it be more or less the subject of a wager, ac- 

 cording as we were less or more acquainted with the rea- 

 sons which influenced the deliberation. The difference 

 resides in the information of the observer, and not in the 

 thing itself; which, in all the cases proposed, proceeds 

 from intelligence, from mind, from counsel, from design. 



Now when this one cause of the appearance of chance, 

 viz. the ignorance of the observer, comes to be apphed to 

 the operations of the Deity, it is easy to foresee how fruit- 

 ful it must prove of difficulties, and of seeming confusion. 



