DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. 299 



ance therewith, was against unjust discrimination, while the 

 law under consideration was directed against all discrimina 

 tions, whether they could be shown to be unjust or not. The 

 decision continues : 



This provision, expressly directing the Legislature to pass laws to 

 prevent unjust discrimination, is a recognition of the palpable fact 

 that there may be discriminations which are not unjust, and by im 

 plication it restrains the power of the Legislature to a prohibition of 

 those which are unjust. That was undoubtedly the object of the 

 Legislature in passing the existing law. This is clearly shown by its 

 title. But the act itself goes further. It forbids any discrimination 

 whatever, under any circumstances whatever, and whether just or 

 unjust, in the charges for transporting the same classes of freight 

 over equal distances, even though moving in opposite directions, and 

 does not permit the companies to show that the discrimination is not 

 unjust. The mere proof of the discrimination makes out a case 

 against the railway companies, which they are not allowed to meet 

 by evidence showing the reason or propriety of the discrimination, 

 and then, upon this sort of ex-parte trial, imposes as a penalty for the 

 offense a forfeiture of the franchise, which would often be equivalent 

 to a fine of millions of dollars. The object of the law is commend 

 able, but such a proceeding, to be followed by such a penalty for the 

 first offense, can not be sustained. It could only have been author 

 ized through the inadvertence of the Legislature. The law as it now 

 stands makes an offense out of an act which might be shown not to 

 be an offense, but an exercise of a wise discretion really beneficial to 

 the people of the State ; and, while debarring the companies from all 

 right of explanation, confiscates their franchises upon the first con 

 viction. The Legislature can not raise a conclusive presumption of 

 guilt against a natural person from any act that may be innocent in 

 itself, taking from him the privilege of showing the actual innocence 

 or propriety of the act, and confiscating his property as a penalty 

 for the supposed offense. Those provisions of our constitution which 

 forbid the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, except by due process 

 of law, and which guarantee the right of trial by jury &quot; as heretofore 

 enjoyed,&quot; and the right in all criminal prosecutions to appear and 

 defend in person and by counsel, would all be violated by such a 

 law. These provisions, it is true, are designed to apply only to 



