A HISTORY OF DURHAM 



Of the two routes, that by CarHsle, from a military point of view, was 

 the most desirable. It was some twenty miles the shorter, and the threat of 

 invasion from this direction kept the English troops concentrated by New- 

 castle, and enabled small parties of Scots to overrun the northern part of 

 Northumberland with comparative impunity. In addition, by using this 

 route the forces in Durham were kept in a state of suspense as to the direction 

 from which they would be attacked, whether the Scots would travel by 

 Consett and the valley of the Browney, as they did in the Neville's Cross 

 campaign, or by the valleys of the Wear or the Tees. 



The fact, however, remains that the Northumbrian route was the one 

 generally adopted. That an army advancing by this direction would protect 

 the fairest part of the lowlands from raiding may account for this, and in 

 addition, the lengthy passage of the Scotch army through their own country, 

 which the Carlisle route involved, must have been very trying to the 

 inhabitants, for even Froissart, a favourable critic, says incidentally of the 

 Scots, ' They are all thieves. ''* The sea route, fortunately for Durham, was 

 closed, as the English always retained the command of the sea, the only effect 

 of the Franco-Scottish alliance being to impede somewhat the passage by sea 

 of supplies to the English garrisons in Scotland. 



Notwithstanding the English command of the sea, alarms of over-sea 

 raids constantly recur. In 1336 the king sent his mandate to the bishop to 

 cause all the ports and the sea-coast within the liberty of Durham to be safely 

 guarded, and to cause all competent men to be arrayed, as an immediate 

 invasion was expected, particulars of the invading fleet — twenty-six galleys 

 and other ships in great numbers — being given. °' 



We now come to the Scotch army, which Froissart, in connexion with 

 the 1327 invasion, describes — 



The Scots are a bold hardy race and much inured to war. When they invaded 

 England they were all usually on horseback, except the camp followers ; they brought no 

 carriages neither did they encumber themselves with any provisions. Under the flap of his 

 saddle each man had a broad plate of metal ; and behind each saddle a little bag of oatmeal, 

 so that when occasion needed cakes were made of oatmeal and baked upon the plates ; for 

 the most part, however, they ate the half soddened flesh of the cattle they captured and drank 

 water."* 



Mobility was the great feature of the Scottish force, which appears to 

 have consisted of feudal levies, though occasionally some Flemish mercenaries 

 were employed to conduct siege operations. It was a force very suitable 

 for raids, but ill adapted to carry out protracted operations, and one of the 

 most marked features of the Scottish invasions is the lack of objective, for 

 they all appear to have been raids for the purpose of plunder and destruction, 

 and not military operations to obtain an effective hold on the country. The 

 difficulties of the Scottish commanders were due partly to the composition of 

 the force under their command — feudal levies liable to service of but short 

 duration, and dependent on plunder for their remuneration — and the want, as 

 a rule, of a regular or mercenary force to direct and undertake the sieges of 

 the important strategic points, the possession of which would have given 

 them a real hold on the country. Probably for this reason the development 



" Froissart, Chronicles sub anno. 

 " Kclkzes Reg. (Rolls Ser.), iv, 201. 

 "" Froissart, Chronicles sub anno. 



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