The Descent of Man 31 



t lie power of reflecting on their own existence, or of inquiring 

 into the nature of objects and their causes. AVe deny that 

 they know that they know or know themselves in knowing. 

 1 n other w^ords, w^e deny them reason. The possession of the 

 presentative faculty, as above explained, in no way implies 

 that of the reflective faculty; nor does any amount of direct 

 operation imply the power of asking the reflective question 

 before mentioned, as to ' what ' and ' why.' 



According to our above given definition, then, the faculties 

 of men and those of other animals differ in kind ; and brutes 

 low in the scale supply us with a good example in support of 

 this distinctness ; for it is in those animals which are generally 

 admitted to be wanting in reason — such as insects (e.g. the 

 ant and the bee) — that w^e have the very summit and per- 

 fection of instinct made known to us. 



We will shortly examine Mr. Darwin's arguments, and see 

 if he can bring forward a single instance of brute action im- 

 plying the existence in it of the representative reflective 

 power. Before doing so, however, one or two points as to 

 the conditions of the controversy must be noticed. 



In the first place, the position which we maintain is the 

 one in possession — that which is commended to us by our 

 intuitions, by ethical considerations, and by religious teaching 

 universally. The onus prohandi should surely therefore rest 

 with him who, attacking the accepted position, maintains the 

 essential similarity and fundamental identity of powers, the 

 effects of which are so glaringly diverse. Yet Mr. Darwin 

 quietly assumes the whole point in dispute, by asserting 

 identity of intuition where there is identity of sensation 

 (vol. i. p. 36), which, of course, implies that there is no 

 mental power whatever except sensation. For if the existence 

 of another faculty were allowed by him, it is plain that the 

 action of that other faculty might modify the effects of mere 

 sensation in any being possessed of such additional faculty. 



