The Descent of Man 45 



identity of kind between the mental faculties of man and of 

 brutes, that identity cannot be established; as we are not 

 likely for many years to meet with a naturalist so competent 

 to collect and marshal facts in support of such identity, if 

 any such facts there are. The old barrier, then, between 

 ' presentative instinct ' and ' representative reason ' remains 

 still unimpaired, and, as we believe, insurmountable. 



We now pass to another question, which is of even greater 

 consequence than that of man's intellectual powers. Mr. 

 Darwin does not hesitate to declare that even the 'moral 

 sense ' is a mere result of the development of brutal instincts. 

 He maintains, ' the first foundation or origin of the moral 

 sense lies in the social instincts, mcluding sympathy; and 

 these instincts no doubt were primarily gained, as in the 

 case of the lower animals, through natural selection ' (vol. ii. 

 p. 394). 



Everything, however, depends upon what we mean by the 

 ' moral sense.' It is a patent fact that there does exist a 

 perception of the qualities ' right ' and ' wrong ' attaching 

 to certain actions. However arising, men have a conscious- 

 ness of an absolute and immutable rule legitimately claim- 

 ing obedience with an authority necessarily supreme and 

 absolute — in other words, intellectual judgments are formed 

 which imply the existence of an ethical ideal in the judging 

 mind. 



It is the existence of this power which has to be accounted 

 for ; neither its application nor even its validity have to be 

 considered. Yet instances of difference of opinion respecting 

 the moral value of particular concrete actions are often 

 brought forward as if they could disprove the existence of 

 moral intuition. Such instances are utterly beside the ques- 

 tion. It is amply sufficient for our purpose if it be conceded 

 that developed reason dictates to us that certain modes of 



