48 The Descent of Man 



some men take pleasure in the pain of others ; and La Roche- 

 foucauld even ventured on the now well-knoAvn saying, ' that 

 there is something in the misfortunes of our best friends not 

 unpleasant to us.' But our feeling that the sufferings of 

 others are pleasant or unpleasant has nothing to do with the 

 question, which refers to the judgment whether the indulging 

 of such feehngs is ' right ' or ' wrong.' 



If the ' social instinct ' were the real basis of the moral 

 sense, the fact that society approved of anything would be 

 recognised as the supreme sanction of it. Not only, however, 

 is this not so, not only do we judge as to whether society in 

 certain cases is right or wrong, but we demand a reason why 

 we should obey society at all ; we demand a rational basis 

 and justification for social claims, if we happen to have a 

 somewhat inquiring turn of mind. We shall be sure 

 avowedly or secretly to despise and neglect the performance 

 of acts which we do not happen to desire, and which have 

 not an intellectual sanction. 



The only passage in which our author seems as if about 

 to meet the real question at issue is very disappointing, as 

 the difficulty is merely evaded. He remarks, ' I am aware 

 that some persons maintain that actions performed impul- 

 sively do not come under the dominion of the moral sense, and 

 cannot be called moral ' (vol. i. p. 87). This is not a correct 

 statement of the intuitive view, and the difficulty is evaded 

 thus : ' But it appears scarcely possible to draw any clear 

 line of distinction of this kind, though the distinction may be 

 real ! ' It seems to us, however, that there is no difficulty at 

 all in drawing a line between a judgment as to an action 

 being right or wrong and every other kind of mental act. 

 Mr. Darwin goes on to say : — 



' Moreover, an action repeatedly performed by us will at last be 

 done without deliberation or hesitation, and can then hardly be dis- 

 tinguished from an instinct ; yet surely no one will pretend that an 



