The Descent of Man. 55 



Mr. Darwin, in a passage before quoted (vol. i. p. 86), slips 

 in the whole of absolute morality, by employing the phrase 

 'appreciation of justice.' Again (vol. i. p. 168), when he 

 speaks of aiding the needy, he remarks: — *Nor could we 

 check our spnpathy, if so urged by hard reason, without 

 deterioration in the noblest part of our nature.' How 

 noblest ? According to Mr. Darwin, a virtuous instinct is a 

 strong and permanent one. There can be, according to his 

 views, no other elements of quality than intensity and dura- 

 tion. Mr. Darwin, in fact, thus silently and unconsciously 

 introduces the moral element into his ' social instinct,' and 

 then, of course, has no difficulty in finding in the latter what 

 he had previously put there. This, however, is quite illegiti- 

 mate, as he makes the social instinct synonymous with the 

 gregariousness of brutes. In such gregariousness, however, 

 there is no moral element, because the mental powers of 

 brutes are not equal to forming reflective, deliberate, repre- 

 sentative judgments. 



The word ' social ' is ambiguous, as gregarious animals 

 may metaphorically be called social, and man's social rela- 

 tions may be regarded both beneficentially and morally. 

 Having first used ' social ' in the former sense, it is sub- 

 sequently applied in the latter ; and it is thus that the really 

 moral conception is silently and illegitimately introduced. 



We may now sum up our judgment of Mr. Darwin's work 

 on the Descent of Man — of its execution and tendency, 

 of what it fails to accomplish and of what it has successfully 

 attained. 



Although the style of the work is, as we have said, fascin- 

 ating, nevertheless we think that the author is somewhat 

 encumbered with the multitude of his facts, which at times 

 he seems hardly able to group and handle so effectively as 

 might be expected from his special talent. Nor does he 



