Evolution and its Conseqziences 93 



or knowledge, then it is no less contrary to fact, inasmuch as our 

 emotions, which constitute a large part of the subject-matter of 

 our thought or of knowledge, are not sensations.' 



It seems to me that this argument is quite unfair, and 

 that it is a false dilemma. The Reviewer's words evidently 

 point to 'sensations' as the condition of our knowledge of 

 external objects, and this, at least, is no truism. For my 

 part, if I understand Professor Huxley rightly, I should 

 assert that to be 'axiomatic' which he says is 'obviously 

 erroneous.' 



The short summary in the Qwartevly Review of the 

 physical characters common to man and brutes on the one 

 hand, and peculiar to man as a rational animal on the other, 

 was evidently not intended as an exhaustive catalogue, but 

 merely as a concise statement of certain leading and essential 

 differences. Therefore 'emotion,' as avowedly common to 

 man and brute, and volition and memory, as beside the 

 question, were reasonably left unnoticed. 



A carping criticism as to the word ' agency ' as applied to 

 sensation in these reflex acts in which sensation intervenes, is 

 what, I confess, I should not have expected from Professor 

 Huxley. He certainly would never think of denying the 

 intervention of sensation in such acts. 



As to his assertion that the Quarterly Reviewer in con- 

 ceding to animals his first four groups of actions, ' grants all 

 that is necessary for the purposes ' of his critic, it is an error 

 which arises from the thorough misapprehension by Professor 

 Huxley of the Reviewer's position, as will be made manifest 

 by what I have to say concerning reason and predication. 



Professor Huxley gives us, in illustration of his views, a 

 comparison between a gamekeeper and a greyhound, both 

 engaged in coursing, the relevancy of which, I confess, 

 escapes me. 



No one denies that man is an animal. No one denies 



