98 Evolution and its Consequences 



the succession, the likeness and unlikeness, of things or their 

 ideas. Whatever does this, reasons; and if a machine 

 produces these effects of reason, I see no more ground for 

 denying to it the reasoning power, because it is unconscious, 

 than I see for refusing to Mr. Babbage's engine the title of a 

 calculating machine on the same grounds.' 



'Thus it seems to me that a gamekeeper reasons 

 whether he is conscious or unconscious, whether his reasoning 

 is carried on by neurosis alone, or whether it involves more 

 or less psychosis.' 



According to my idea of the matter, predication essen- 

 tially consists not in marking 'succession, likenesses and 

 unlikenesses,' but in recognising these relations as true. 



To this extent I may shelter myself under the authority 

 of Mr. John Stuart Mill. Mr. MiU, in criticising Sir William 

 Hamilton's definition of judgment, makes the following 

 remarks (Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philo- 

 sophy, p. 346) : — 



* The first objection which, I think, must occur to any one, on the 

 contemplation of this definition, is that it omits '^Ae main and charac- 

 teristic element of a judgment and of a proposition. . . . When we 

 judge or assert, there is introduced a new element, that of objective 

 reality, and a new mental fact, belief. Our judgments, and the 

 assertions which express them, do not enunciate our mere mode of 

 mentally conceiving things, but our conviction or persuasion that the 

 facts are conceived actually exist ; and a theory of judgments and 

 propositions which does not take account of this, cannot he a true 

 theory. In the words of Reid " I give the name of judgment to every 

 determination of the mind concerning what is true or what is false. 

 This, I think, is what logicians, from the days of Aristotle, have called 

 judgment." And this is the very element which Sir William 

 Hamilton's definition ' [and I may now add Professor Huxley's also] 

 * omits from it.' 



Further on Mr. Mill says : — ^ 



'Belief is an essential element in a judgment. . . . The recognition 

 ^ As before quoted. See ante, vol. i. p. 405. 



