'^^P it as true is not only an essential part, but the essential element 

 of it as a judgment ; leave that out, and there remains a mere play of 

 thought, in which no judgment is passed. It is impossible to separate 

 the idea of judgment from the idea of the truth of a judgment ; for 

 every judgment consists in judging something to be true. The ele- 

 ment belief, instead of being an accident which can be passed in 

 silence, and admitted only by implication, constitutes the very differ- 

 ence between a judgment and any other intellectual fact, and it is 

 contrary to all the laws of definition to define judgment by anything 

 else. The very meaning of a judgment or a proposition is something 

 which is capable of being believed or disbelieved ; which can be true 

 or false ; to which it is possible to say yes or no.' 



In addition to this, Mr. Mill, in his notes on his father's, 

 Mr. James MiU's, Analysis of the Human Mind, ably shows, 

 against Mr. Herbert Spencer, that rational belief cannot be 

 explained as being identical with indissoluble association (voL 

 i. p. 402). 



In denying, then, reason to brutes — in denying that their 

 acts are rational, I do not, of course, deny for a moment that 

 they are rational in the sense in which Mr. Babbage's 

 machine is calculating, but what I do maintain is, that brutes 

 have not the power of forming judgments in the sense 

 above explained. And I still more emphatically deny that 

 brutes have any, even the very dimmest, consciousness of 

 such ideas as ' ought ' and moral excellence. And because I 

 further believe that no amount of sensible experiences can 

 generate these conceptions, I deny that any brute is even 

 potentially a moral agent. Those who credit brutes with 

 'morahty,' do so by first eliminating from that idea all its 

 essential characteristics. 



One word now of explanation. Professor Huxley seems 

 much disturbed at my speaking of virtue as, in his view, a 

 kind of retrieving, ^ and accuses me of imposing an ' injurious 



^ See ante, vol. i.'p. 326, and also my Genesis of Species, 2nd ed., pp. 213 

 and 232. . 



