specific Genesis wj 



' that variability and selection do really exist and act,' which 

 appear to me quite as much abstractions as polarity or 

 attraction. 



Mr. Wright divides * intellectual genius ' into three classes : 

 No. 1, 'that which pursues successfully the researches for un- 

 kno^vn causes by the skilful use of hypothesis and experi- 

 ment'; No. 2, 'that which, avoiding the use of hypothesis 

 and preconceptions altogether, and the delusive influence 

 of names, briQgs together in clear connection, and contrasts 

 in classification, the objects of nature in their broadest and 

 realist relations of resemblance'; and No. 3, 'that which 

 seeks with success for reasons and authorities in support of 

 cherished convictions.' 



I might remark on the purely arbitrary character of this 

 classification. But letting this pass, it must be said that 

 class No. 1 is but a poor monster without No. 2 ; and that 

 No. 1 is frequently, consciously or unconsciously, also No. 3 ; 

 nor would it be difiicult to bring forward an example. 



A more real distinction is that to be drawn between the 

 ' scientific ' and the ' philosophical ' habits of mind, and under 

 these two great genera come subordinate distinctions of 

 different degrees of importance. Now, a naturalist may 

 attain great scientific eminence without being anything of a 

 philosopher, and, similarly, a philosopher need have little 

 acquaintance with physical science ; but from the nature of 

 their respective pursuits a different character of mind in each 

 case tends to be developed. It is from this distinction that 

 we find (as we might a priori expect to be the case) such 

 breadth of view, freedom of handling, and flexibility of mind 

 on the part of philosophers who are not naturalists, as com- 

 pared with men great in physical science, who are not at the 

 same time philosophers; a certain rigidity and narrowness 

 seeming to result from the exercise of the mind merely in 

 the arena of physics. 



