Herbert spencer 129 



and fundamental agreement with the great sceptic of Scot- 

 land. 



Thus though fifty years ago the world of thought pro- 

 nounced Hume for ever defeated by Kant, we find Hume 

 once more in possession of the field ; and even the extreme 

 sensationalism of Condillac is justified, nay, demonstrated to 

 be inevitable truth, by the author who here concerns us. 

 Indeed Mr. Spencer may, in a certain sense, be deemed the 

 legitimate descendant and representative of Locke, as under- 

 stood by those who refuse to attribute to the term ' reflexion,' 

 as used by him, a meaning which would stultify him as to 

 his whole philosophical position. 



An inquiry into the causes of this untoward resurrection 

 would be full of interest, but cannot, as too remote from the 

 matter in hand, be here pursued. The mere existence, 

 however, of such a revival would seem to demonstrate that 

 the Professor of Konigsberg did not dig deeply enough in 

 his attempted process of eradication. But Mr. Spencer is 

 far from being a mere reviver of Hume, of Locke, or of any 

 other philosopher. Indeed, as we shall presently see, he 

 differs from Locke in admitting, in a certain sense, ' innate 

 ideas,' while he combats Hume with vigour and efficiency, 

 and may not improbably quite repudiate the imputation of 

 being a disciple of that philosopher. 



It is as the philosophical embodiment of modern physi- 

 cal science that Mr. Spencer is pre-eminently distinguished. 

 Science has indeed made vast acquisitions since the time of 

 Hume, and the stored-up accumulation of its facts contains 

 materials calculated to affect powerfully the imagination of 

 mankind. Now Mr. Spencer's philosophy is replete with 

 conceptions and inferences derived from that accumulated 

 treasure. It is by such scientific progress, by the indirect 

 influences of physical science on philosophy, that this develop- 

 ment of reactionary sensationalism must be explained. New 



VOL. II. I 



