132 Herbe7't Spencer 



course, vitiates the argument of the whole school he repre- 

 sents, in so far as that school rests on the same basis. Hence 

 it is of great importance that the foundations of his system 

 should be tested with all possible care ; for if those founda- 

 tions are solid, the skill of the architect is too great for us to 

 expect to find weakness and insecurity in any portion of the 

 superstructure. 



No one who knows anything of philosophy will for a 

 moment suppose that a general examination of Mr. Spencer's 

 whole system can be eifected within the limit of this essay : 

 it will be only possible for us to glance at a few of its more 

 obvious features. We would especially direct attention to 

 two points, to both of which we are confident objections may 

 be made; and although Mr. Spencer has himself doubtless 

 considered such objections (and they may well have struck 

 many of his readers also), we nevertheless do not observe that 

 he has anywhere noticed or provided for them. 



The two points we so select are : — 



(1) Thai his system involves the denial of all truth. 



(2) That it is radically and necessarily opposed to all 



sound principles of morals. 



In proceeding to establish these points, we would repeat 

 our high admiration for Mr. Spencer's intellectual and moral 

 character, and would repudiate in the strongest terms the 

 slightest intention of making any reflection upon Mr. Spencer 

 personally, while we state the grave objections to which his 

 philosophical system seems to us open. 



If there is one fundamental characteristic of Mr. Spencer's 

 philosophy, it is its emphatic assertion of the relativity — the 

 merely phenomenal character— .-of all our knowledge. But 

 this fundamental position is not by any means special and 

 pecuhar to Mr. Spencer, but is the common property of the 

 whole school of modern Humists, such as Messrs. Mill, Lewes, 

 Bain, and Huxley. With Mr Spencer the relativity of know- 



