140 Herbert Spencer 



festly by introspection alone — the careful analysis of con- 

 sciousness by each one for himself. In order successfully to 

 combat with those who accept idealism, we must, for the 

 sake of those who do not accept the nature-given bridge 

 between object and subject, begin from a purely subjective 

 basis. This, as we have already seen, is the method declared 

 necessary by Mr. Spencer himself, and he also tells us ^ to 

 the same effect : — 



' The first step in a metaphysical argument, rightly carried on, 

 must be an examination of propositions for the purpose of ascertain- 

 ing what character is common to those which we call unquestionably 

 true, and is implied by asserting their unquestionable truth. Further, 

 to carry on this inquiry legitimately, we must restrict our analysis 

 rigorously to states of consciousness considered in their relations to 

 one another: whoUy ignoring anything beyond consciousness to 

 which these states and their relations may be supposed to refer. 

 For if, before we have ascertained by comparing propositions what 

 is the trait that leads us to class some of them as certainly true, we 

 avowedly or tacitly take for granted the existence of something 

 beyond consciousness ; then, a particular proposition is assumed to 

 be certainly true before we have ascertained what is the distinctive 

 character of the propositions which we call certainly true, and the 

 analysis is vitiated. If we cannot transcend consciousness — if, 

 therefore, what we know as truth must be some mental state, or 

 some combination of mental states; it must be possible for us to 

 say in what way we distinguish this state or these states. The 

 definition of truth must be expressible in terms of consciousness; 

 and, indeed, cannot otherwise be expressed if consciousness cannot 

 be transcended.' 



Now, although we have the good fortune to agree, to a 

 certain extent, with Mr. Herbert Spencer as to the limits 

 and necessary conditions of inquiry, yet our view as to the 

 ultimate and final test of all truth whatever differs pro- 

 foundly and fundamentally from his. We differ from him, 

 and deem his conception of this test to be inadequate and 



1 Essays, vol. ii. p. 381 (stereotyped edition). 



