I 



Herbert Spencer 141 



false, because he makes that test a purely negative one. 

 He asserts that 'inconceivability' is the ultimate and 

 supreme test of truth. He tells us : — 1 



*A discussion in consciousness proves to be simply a trial of 

 strength between different connections in consciousness — a systema- 

 tised struggle serving to determine which are the least coherent 

 states of consciousness. And the result of the struggle is, that the 

 least coherent states of consciousness separate while the most 

 coherent remain together; forming a proposition of which the pre- 

 dicate persists in the mind along with its subject. ... If there are 

 any indissoluble connections, he is compelled to accept them. If 

 certain states of consciousness absolutely cohere in certain ways, he 

 is obliged to think them in those ways. . . . Here, then, the 

 inquirer comes down to an ultimate uniformity — a universal law of 

 thinking.' 



We have said we consider Mr. Spencer's test inadequate, 

 and we do so because we are convinced that his analysis 

 of consciousness is incomplete and misleading. He fails to 

 distinguish between two distinct classes of ultimate psychical 

 phenomena, and consequently does not really accept, as he 

 professes to do, the absolute dicta of consciousness for the 

 basis of his philosophy. He fails to distinguish between 

 merely negative mental impotencies or simple inconceiva- 

 bilities and positive 'convictions' or 'intuitions.' He fails 

 to note the utterly different classes of judgments which 

 severally affirm either that they simply cannot conceive a 

 given proposition to be true, or that they positively do see 

 that the opposite of a given proposition cannot be true. 

 Negative perceptions of simple inconceivabihty are reflex, 

 but positive intuitions (as when we gaze at a picture on the 

 wall before us) are direct. 



Mr. Spencer distinguishes between two classes of unbe- 

 hevable propositions, namely: (1) the simple unbelievable 



1 Psychology, vol. ii. p. 450. 



