He7^bert Spencer \^\ 



unconditionally rely on them as the report of truthful faculties ; and 

 in either case is on the same footing as his b, priori neighbour. Be 

 the " proof " what it may which authenticates the belief, it is the 

 faculty which, in the last resort, authenticates the proof.' 



In the controversy, therefore, between Mr. Spencer and 

 Mr. Mill it appears to us to be clear that both are right and 

 both are wrong. Mr. Mill we deem right in affirming that 

 there are inconceivabilities which may yet be beheved, but 

 wrong in denying that our subjective judgments as to im- 

 possibility and necessity are both objectively valid and 

 supreme criteria of truth. Mr. Spencer seems to us right 

 in affirming that the ultimate declarations of our intellect 

 are such supreme criteria of truth, but wrong in declining 

 to attribute to such declarations absolute necessity and 

 universal objective validity. But we are convinced that 

 both Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer err in faiHng to distinguish 

 between (1) that negative inconceivability which comes from 

 impotence or lack of experience ; and (2) that positive, active 

 perception of impossibility which comes from intellectual 

 power and light. It is this active perception which reveals 

 to us truths, neither the result of mere experience nor of 

 logical ratiocination ; since they are no sooner thought of 

 than we assent to them, and the validity of all generalisation 

 and deduction rests upon them as upon original and funda- 

 mental principles. 



The following propositions seem, then, to be incontro- 

 vertible : — 



1. Knowledge must rest on truths which are incapable of 

 being proved, but are evident by their own intrinsic light, 

 otherwise we have either absolute scepticism or a regressus 

 ad infinitum. 



2. These fundamental truths must be subjectively evident. 



3. Such fundamental subjective truths declare their ob- 

 jective, absolute, and universal truth. 



