152 Herbert Spencer 



4. The intellect is thus carried by its own force from sub- 

 jectivity to objectivity. 



From this it follows that we have a supreme degree of 

 certainty as regards a variety of objective truths which the 

 intellect has the power of apprehending by the aid of sensible 

 phenomena. Our rational nature is thus seen to be capable 

 of knowing truly what is within its range, and is justified in 

 its conviction as to metaphysical certainty. The same degree 

 of inevitable certainty, guarded by the same penalty of 

 absolute scepticism, attends other dicta. That 'whatever 

 thinks exists ' is known to us as necessary a imori truth by 

 its own evidence, but that I myself exist is known to me, not 

 by evidence of any kind, but by consciousness, to be a par- 

 ticular contingent fact of supreme certainty. 



Mr. Spencer is hardly clear in his enunciations as to our 

 knowledge of our own continued personal existence. In his 

 chapter on ' The Substance of Mind,' ^ he remarks : — 



' If by the phrase " substance of mind" is to be understood Mind 

 as qualitatively differentiated in each portion that is separable by 

 introspection but seems homogeneous and undecomposable, then we 

 do know something about the substance of mind, and may eventually 

 know more. Assuming 2 an underlying something, it is possible in 

 some cases to see, and in the rest to conceive, how these multi- 

 tudinous modifications of it arise. But if the phrase is taken to 

 mean the underlying something of which these distinguishable por- 

 tions are formed, or of which they are modifications ; then we know 

 nothing about it, and never can know anything about it' 



Now if by this Mr. Spencer means we cannot know our 

 own soul otherwise than in and by its acts, he only asserts 

 what has been ever taught by the schools to which he 

 is the most opposed. No rational metaphysician ever taught 

 that the soul could be known by us in its essence or other- 

 wise than by its acts. But if by the passage quoted he 

 would deny that we have direct consciousness of an enduring 



^ Psychology, vol. i. p. 145. ^ It may well be asked, On what ground ? 



