164 Herbert Spencer 



follow from that theory, however understood, or are they 

 confined to the Spencerian and Darwinian forms of it ? 



It is, indeed, certain that any view of Evolution which 

 should deny every distinction of ki^nd between the mind of 

 man and the psychical faculties of brutes would necessarily 

 involve all the consequences here deprecated. But no such 

 bar exists to the acceptance of Evolution as applied to the 

 ' unfolding,' from potential into real existence, of constantly 

 new forms of animals and plants. Even the actualisation 

 (upon the occurrence of the requisite conditions) of latent life 

 and sentiency in inorganic matter — so far as such life and 

 sentiency be conceived of as depending upon and consequently 

 united with material substance — may be affirmed without 

 involving the results objected to by us. Such a theory of 

 Evolution perfectly harmonises with the presence in man of 

 that substantial and persistent soul which, as we have seen, 

 the voice of consciousness agrees with those of reason and 

 volition in demanding. If the existence of that distinct intel- 

 lectual principle in man be conceded, then all the objections 

 above given fall to the ground. Such a theory — 



1. Accounts for and harmonises with the dicta of con- 

 sciousness as to the Ego. 



2. It readily accepts the declarations of reason as to ulti- 

 mate and necessary truths. 



3. It asserts that power of election which our reason and 

 perception of responsibility make known to us. 



4. It, of course, fully accepts the principle of contradiction, 

 and thereby induces order into our intellectual cognitions. 



5. It accords with the teaching of common-sense without 

 being bound down within its limits. 



6. It estabhshes the distinction between reason and in- 

 stinct, and between language and emotional expressions. 



7. It takes cognisances of our highest perceptions, in- 

 cluding those of truth, goodness, and beauty as such. 



