2 1 2 Address to the British Association 



sion to it persist unmodified in the mind side by side with 

 the judgment they have called up. Let us take, as examples, 

 the judgments ' That thing is good to eat,' and ' Nothing can 

 be and not be at the same time and in the same sense.' As to 

 the former, we vaguely imagine ' things good to eat,' but they 

 exist beside the judgment, not in it. They can be recalled, 

 compared, and seen to co-exist. So with the other judgment^ 

 the mind is occupied with certain abstract ideas though the 

 imagination has certain vague 'images' answering respec- 

 tively to ' a thing being ' and ' a thing not being,' and to ' At 

 the same time ' and ' in the same sense ' ; but the images do 

 not constitute the judgment itself any more than human 

 ' swimming ' is made up of ' limbs and fluid,' though without 

 such necessary elements no such swimming could take place. 



This distinction is also shown by the fact that one and 

 the same idea may be suggested to, and maintained in, the 

 mind by the help of the most incongruous images, and very 

 different ideas by the very same image. This we may 

 see to be the case with such ideas as 'number,' 'motion,' 

 ' identity,' etc. 



But the distinctness of ' thought ' from ' imagination ' may 

 perhaps be made clearer by the drawing out fully what we 

 really do when we make some simple judgment, as, e.g., that 

 ' a negro is black.' Here,^ in the first place, we directly and 

 exphcitly affirm that there is a conformity between the ex- 

 ternal thing, ' a negro,' and the external quahty, ' blackness ' 

 — the negro possessing that quahty. We affirm secondarily 

 and implicitly a conformity between the two external entities 

 and the two corresponding internal concepts. And thirdly, 

 and lastly, we also implicitly affirm the existence of a con- 

 formity between the subjective judgment and the objective 

 existence. 



All that it seems to me evident that sentience can do, is 



1 An illustration which we have elsewhere used. See ante, vol. i, p. 437. 



