2 14 Address to the British Association 



by virtue of mere association, the siniple objective conjunc- 

 tion of the previous sounds, movements, and consequent 

 sensations of taste, would suffice to set up the same move- 

 ments on the present occasion.' Let certain sensations and 

 movements become associated, and then the former need not 

 be noted : they only need to exist in order that the association 

 should produce its effects, and simulate apprehension, delibera- 

 tion, inference, and volition. ' AVhen the circumstances of any 

 present case differ from those of any past experience, but 

 imperfectly resemble those of many past experiences, parts of 

 these, and consequent actions, are irregularly suggested by 

 the laws of resemblance, until some action is hit on which 

 relieves pain or gives pleasure. For instance, .... let a dog 

 be lost by his mistress in a field in which he has never been 

 before. The presence of the group of sensations which we 

 know to indicate his mistress is associated with pleasure, and 

 its absence with pain. By past experience an association has 

 been formed between this feeling of pain and such movements 

 of the head as tend to recover some part of that group, its 

 recovery being again associated with movements which, de 

 facto, diminish the distance between the dog and his mistress. 

 The dog, therefore, pricks up his ears, raises his head and 

 looks round. His mistress is nowhere to be seen ; but at the 

 corner of the field there is visible a gate at the end of a lane 

 which resembles a lane in which she has been used to walk. 

 A phantasm (or image) of that other lane, and of his mistress 

 walking there, presents itself to the imagination of the dog ; 

 he runs to the present lane, but on getting into it she is not 

 there. From the lane, however, he can see a tree at the 

 other side of which she was wont to sit ; the same process is 

 repeated, but she is not to be found. Having arrived at the 

 tree, he thence finds his way home.' By the action of such 

 feelings, imaginations, and associations — which we know to 

 be verce causae — I believe all the apparently intelligent actions 

 of animals may be explained without the need of calling in 



