Address to the British Association 2 1 7 



(whensoever and howsoever arising), which for a time mani- 

 fests itself by the activities of a certain mass of complex 

 material, with which it is so entirely one,^ that it may be said 

 to constitute and he such animal or plant much rather than 

 the lump of matter which we can see and handle can be said 

 to constitute such animal or plant. On this view a so-called 

 ^ dead bird ' is no bird at all, save by abuse of language, nor is 

 a 'corpse' really a 'dead man' — such terms being as self- 

 contradictory as would be the expression 'a dead living 

 creature.' 



Thus the real essence, the substantial constituent, of 

 every living thing is something which escapes our senses, 

 though its existence and nature reveal themselves to the 

 intellect. 



For of course our senses can detect nothing in an animal 

 or plant beyond the qualities of its material component 

 parts. But neither is the function of an organ to be 

 detected save in and by the actions of such organ, and yet 

 we do not deny it its function or consider that function to be 

 a mere blending and mixture of the properties of the tissues 

 which compose it. Similarly it would seem to be unreason- 

 able to deny the existence of a living principle of individua- 

 tion because we can neither see nor feel it, but only infer it. 

 This power or polar force, which is immanent in each living 

 body, or rather which is that body living, is of course 

 unimaginable by us, since we cannot by imagination 



■cally distinct from the living body, and capable of surviving the destruction 

 of the latter. But as structure and function ever vary together (as do the 

 convexities and concavities of a curved line), so 'the principle of individuation' 

 or soul of an animal or plant and its material organisation must necessarily 

 arise, vary, and be destroyed simultaneously, unless some special character, as 

 in the case of man, may lead us to consider it exceptional in nature. Even 

 in man, however, there seems no adequate reason for believing in the existence 

 of any principle of individuation, save that which exerts its energy in all his 

 functions, the humblest as well as the most exalted. 

 ^ See ante^ vol. i. p. 430. 



