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Hermann Lotze and the Mechanical Philosophy 28 



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justified in making use of a mechanical theory of nature as a 

 practically useful working hypothesis. But after admitting 

 ind affirming this, our author goes on to also affirm that 

 beyond the domains of merely physical science (which though 

 nuch, is not everything) reason does demand a non- 

 nechanical conception, namely, the conception of an imma- 

 lent active principle or soul in everything which lives. This 

 conception (which we ourselves have always maintained ^ as 

 )eing a conception demanded by philosophy, as distinguished 

 rom the sphere of merely physical science), is fully upheld 

 )y our author, and we will now confine ourselves to a few 

 eferences to passages in his Microcosmns which support this 

 assertion. 



Thus, as to the inadequacy of the popular conception of 

 iXternal forces without the presence of an immanent internal 

 -etivity, he says : 2 ' Forces do not attach themselves to a 

 ifeless inner nature of things, but must arise out of them, 

 nd nothing can take place between the individual elements 

 Lntil something has taken place within them.' Again, as to 

 he inadequacy of material conceptions of organic unity, he 

 ells us : ^ ' Our ideas of the connection of organic parts are too 

 auch modelled on that of a bundle of objects, which being 

 idifferent to one another and totally destitute of cohesive 

 ower, need to be tied together by a bond external to them 

 11. That is the meaning of the common craving to know 

 tie bond that holds together the body and the soul, or the 

 onstituents of the body, or, lastly, the mental elements, 

 or the connecting principle of these last, though probably 

 onceived as higher in its nature than a material bond, is yet 

 ot thought of as essentially different from a cord ; for it 



^ The conception which we have maintained is that of Aristotle, namely, 

 le conception not of an immaterial substance distinct from the material 

 •ganism of a living animal or plant, but of an active principle of individual- 

 m absolutely one with the living material organism of such animal or 

 aut. 2 Vol j p 49 3 ij^ia,^ p. 58. 



