286 Hermann Lotze and the Mechanical Philosophy 



universally displayed by grammar, however imperfect and 

 rudimentary. ' If there are everywhere ^ forms for substan- 

 tives, verbs, and adjectives, this shows that the mind must 

 have developed everywhere the notions of Thing, of Becoming, 

 or of Quality.' Lotze fully recognises ^ our need of language, 

 since though ' of course it does not impart to the mind the 

 elements of thinking, yet it is indispensable when the mind 

 has to combine these elements into the spacious fabric of its 

 culture.' Nevertheless he also fully recognises that thought 

 is wider and greater than language, and that the spoken 

 word, the verbum oris, is a check and restriction on the 

 nobler verhnm mentale. Thus, after showing ^ that the fact 

 of our being able to make comparisons proves that we can 

 entertain two ideas simultaneously, he adds : ' The habit of 

 mental speech really retards the passage of thought by 

 breaking up into a sequence what was originally simul- 

 taneous.' 'Thinking, of course,* itself requires some time, 

 but the constant recollection of words protracts the time by 

 its dependence on Ipodily conditions from which thinking 

 could have kept itself free.' ' Thought,' he tells us, ^ ' is not 

 so absolutely dependent on language that combinations of 

 sounds are of necessity the medium through which it ex- 

 presses its formal conception of the control of presentation.' 

 On the contrary,^ 'language is often a hindrance to the 

 cultivated understanding,' because it does not follow the 

 codifications of thought ' with sufficient pliabiHty/ 



Some other prejudices and mental imperfections which 

 favour a mechanical and materialistic view of nature are also 

 forcibly pointed out in the work. Thus he observes '^ that, 

 'spoiled by the successes of physical science, we too often 

 regard maxims, unquestionably valid for the explanation of 



1 Vol. i. p. 679. 2 7^„-^^ pp 634 ^nd 637. ^ j^^i^^ ^ 213. 



< IbicL, p. 632. '^ Ibid., p. 624. « Ibid., p. 680. 



" Ibid., pp. 195, 275, and 276. 



