298 A Limit to Evolution 



In looking at a revolving cube, we only see portions of it 

 at a time, and its square faces, seen in perspective, do not 

 look square. Nevertheless, through these imperfect sensible 

 signs, we have an adequate perception of the whole cube as 

 it is in itself. Observe, also, that the very revolution of the 

 cube (and the consequent changing of our sensations) does 

 not change our intellectual perception, which remains the 

 same throughout. Perception, then, is a natural and spon- 

 taneous interpretation of sensible sights by a special poAver of 

 our intelligence — a power which can be much improved by 

 practice. 



But into what does this natural power interpret the signs 

 given through our sense-organs by external things ? Into 

 the apprehension of some object which, as standing, as it 

 were opposite to our mind, we call ' objective ' ; while all the 

 feelings that object produces in us, as being affections of us 

 — of the subject who feels — we call 'subjective.' In every 

 perception, then, we perceive an object of some kind. It 

 may be we know it as ' a horse,' or if not that, as a 'quadruped,* 

 or as ' a living creature ' only, or merely as ' a solid body,' and 

 if we cannot be sure even of that, then at least we perceive it 

 as something. 



' Something ! ' What a wonderful idea is enshrined in 

 that most familiar expression sometJiing ! It is the idea of 

 ' existence! the idea of ' being.' It is an idea which, however 

 its latent implications may be unfolded, is itself inexplicable, 

 for no one can even ask what it is, without showing by his 

 very question that he both possesses and understands it. 

 The idea of being, or existence, is one which is applicable to 

 everything which can be conceived of by the mind. Those 

 other (much more restricted) apprehensions or ideas of 

 objects just mentioned — ' solid body,' ' living creature,' ' horse,' 

 etc. — are also each applicable to a greater or less number of 

 things. Thus even the idea ' horse,' is applicable to a multi* 



