304 A Limit to Evolution 



explicit judgments, we are in a position to appreciate more 

 fiiUy than before the fundamental difference which exists 

 between feelings and ideas. We may now see that feelings 

 are not only particular and subjective, but are also impres- 

 sions made on our sensitivity by really subsisting and 

 individual, that is, concrete, properties of bodies ; while ideas 

 are abstract as well as universal. Again, the same feeUngs 

 are, under similar conditions, excited by the same sense im- 

 pressions ; while not only may the same idea be called forth 

 by very different sets of sense impressions, but also the same 

 set of sense impressions may call forth very different ideas. 

 Thus the abstract idea 'Motion' may be apprehended 

 through — (1) the passage of the image of an object over the 

 retina ; (2) the feeling of something slipping over our skin ; 

 (3) the feelings of tension, etc., produced by the muscles of 

 our eye-balls in following an object with our eyes; (4) the 

 sensations of touch given by a moving object while we grasp 

 it, etc. Yet the resulting idea — ' Motion ' — is one and the same, 

 however differently it may have been acquired. Again, the 

 sight of a photograph of the Queen may give rise to very 

 different ideas; for example — (1) to that of Her Majesty 

 herself; (2) to that of 'royal rank'; (3) to that of 'woman- 

 hood'; (4) to that of 'humanity'; (5) to that of 'resem- 

 blance ' ; (6) to that of ' Hght and shade ' ; (7) to that of the 

 sun's actinic power; (8) to that of 'chemical process'; or 

 (9) to that of ' the substance paper,' etc., till we come at last 

 to the idea of 'being' or 'existence.' Again, feelings can 

 never be reflective. They can never reflect on feelings. We 

 may also have, as has been pointed out, feelings of self- 

 activity, but not of any one feeling being of the kind it is. 

 It is quite otherwise with our ideas ; not only may an ideal 

 abstract quahty be made a direct object of thought, and be, 

 as it were, held up opposite the mind for examination ; but 

 the idea itself may be perceived and recognised as being 



