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1 8 Organic Nature s Riddle 



has been objected (by the late Mr. G. H. Leaves and others) 

 that we cannot be sure but that the spinal cord itself ' feels.' 

 But there is often an ambiguity in the use of the term * to 

 feel.' By it we ordinarily mean a ' modification of conscious- 

 ness ' ; but experiences such as those just adverted to, and 

 others in ourselves to which I shall next advert, show clearly 

 that surrounding agents may act upon our sense organs 

 without the intervention of anything like consciousness, and 

 yet produce effects otherwise similar to those which occur 

 when they do arouse consciousness. Without, then, entering 

 into any discussion as to whether ' sentiency ' may or may 

 not be attributed to the spinal cord, it seems evident that 

 some definite term is required to denote such affections or 

 modifications of living beings as those just referred to. Inas- 

 much as they are affections of creatures possessing a nervous 

 system, which is the essential organ of sensation, and as they 

 resemble sensation in their causes and effects though feeling 

 itself may be absent, they may be provisionally distinguished 

 as 'unfelt sensations.' Such are some of the actions with 

 which instinct is contrasted, because, unlike instinct, they 

 are not carried on by the aid of felt sensations, the highest 

 of such insentient action being reflex action. 



There are also a number of actions Avhich constantly 

 recur in ourselves, which more or less nearly approximate to 

 reflex action. Thus the respu-atory movements, the various 

 muscular motions by the aid of which we breathe, are ordin- 

 arily performed by us without advertence ; though we can, 

 if we will, perform them with self-conscious deliberation. 

 It is well also to note that when our mind is entirely 

 directed upon some external object, or when we are almost 

 in a state of somnolent unconsciousness, we have but a vague 

 feehng of our existence — a feeling resulting from the unob- 

 served synthesis of our sensations of aU orders and degrees. 

 This uninteUectual sense of 'self may be conveniently dis-. 



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