320 Organic Nature s Riddle 



stimulus to definite actions which has its foundation in a 

 certain sense of want, but is not a definite feehng of want 

 of the particular end to be attained. Were that recognised, 

 it would not be instinct, but desire. It is but a vague 

 craving to exercise certain activities the exercise of which 

 conduces to useful or needful, but unforeseen, ends. Instinct 

 often sets in motion organs quite different from those which 

 feel the prick of want, and which do not (experience apart) 

 seem to have relation with it. Hunger does not stimulate 

 to action the organs of digestion which suffer from it, but 

 excites the limbs and jaws to perform acts by which food 

 may be obtained and eaten. In examining into instinct, 

 we must be careful not to omit the consideration of it as 

 it exists in man, since we can know no creature so well 

 as we can, by the help of language and reflection, know 

 ourselves and our own species. Nevertheless, it may be 

 well to begin by calling attention to certain apparently 

 undeniable cases of instinct in other animals, since in 

 them instinct is much more apparent and complex than 

 in man, in whom it is indeed reduced to a minimum. 

 It might naturally be expected to be so reduced in him — 

 if it is a power serving to bridge over the gulf which exists 

 between such almost mechanical action as reflex action, and 

 true intelligence — since in man acts of intelligence, or habits 

 originated through intelligence, come so constantly into play. 

 But before enumerating cases of animal instinct, a word 

 should be said as to one character which M. Lemoine attri- 

 butes to instinctive action, namely, ' consciousness.' This 

 term is an exceedingly ambiguous one, as it is often referred, 

 not only to our distinct intellectual perception of our own 

 being and acts, but also to every state of feeling however 

 rudimentary it may be. I would therefore avoid the use 

 of so equivocal a term, while fully admitting that no sensa- 

 tion in any animal is possible without some subjective 



