second element is the recognition of what is so reproduced 

 as being connected with the past. 



I^K There is yet a further distinction which may be drawn 



^Rtween acts of true recollection. 



We are all aware that every now and then we direct our 

 attention to try and recall something which we know we 

 have for the moment forgotten, and which we instantly 

 recognise when we have recalled it. But besides this volun- 

 tary memory we are sometimes startled by the flashing into 

 consciousness of something we had forgotten, and which we 

 were so far from trying to recollect that we were thinking 

 of something entirely different. 



There are, then, two kinds of true memory — one in which 

 the will intervenes, and which may be spoken of as recol- 

 lection, and the other in which it does not, and which may 

 be termed rer^iiniscence} Neither of these can exist in a 

 creature destitute of true self-consciousness. There are, how- 

 ever, two other kinds of repeated action which take place even 

 in ourselves, and which should be carefully distinguished. 



The first of these are practically automatic actions, which 

 are repeated unconsciously after having been learned, as in 

 walking, reading, speaking, and often in playing some musical 

 instrument. In a certain vague and improper sense we may 

 be said — having learned how to do these things — to recollect 

 how to do them ; but unless the mind recognises the past in 

 the present while performing them they are not instances 

 of memory, but merely a form of habit in which conscious- 

 ness may or may not intervene. 



The second class of repeated actions just referred to are, 

 on the other hand, those in which consciousness cannot be 

 made to intervene, and are mere acts of organic habit. Thus 

 a man wrecked on an island inhabited by savages, and long 

 dwelling there, may at first have the due action of his 



1 See ante, p. 209. 



