354 Organic Nature s Riddle • 



G. When we so ' know ' a thing that it can be done with 

 perfect unconsciousness, we cannot be said to ' know ' it 

 intellectually, although in doing that thing our nervous 

 and motor mechanism acts (in response to sensational stimuli) 

 as perfectly as, or more perfectly than, in our conscious 

 activity. The ' knowledge ' which accompanies such ' un- 

 conscious action' is improperly so called, except in so far 

 as we may be able to direct our minds to its perception, 

 and so render it worthy of the name — as we have seen we 

 may direct attention to our unconscious reminiscences, and 

 so make them conscious ones. In the same way then in 

 which we have already distinguished such acts of memory 

 (while unconscious) as sensuous memory, so we may dis- 

 tinguish such acts of apprehension (while unconscious) as 

 sensuous cognition. By it we can understand, to a certain 

 extent, what may be the 'knowledge' or 'sensuous cogni- 

 tion ' of mere animals. 



D. Besides the above three kinds of apprehensions, we 

 may distinguish others which can be only very remotely, 

 if at all, compared with knowledge, since they can never, 

 by any effort, be brought within the sphere of conscious- 

 ness. Such are the actions of our organism by which it 

 responds to impressions in an orderly and appropriate but 

 unfelt manner — the intimate actions of our visceral organs, 

 which can be modified, within Umits, according to the 

 influence brought to bear on them, as we may see in the 

 oarsman's hand, the blacksmith's arm, and the ballet- 

 dancer's leg. 



If such actions could be spoken of as in any sense 

 apprehensive, they would have to be spoken of as * organic 

 cognitions,' but they may be best distinguished as ' organic 

 response ' or ' organic correspondence' 



That the inorganic world, no less than the organic, is 

 instinct with reason, and that we find in it objective con- 



