OLEOMARGARINE. 15 



believe that the proposed law is an unwarrantable interference by the 

 Congress of the United States with their conduct of a legitimate 

 business. 



We protest against the bill, in the first place, upon the broad ground 

 that we consider it a dishonest act dishonest in purpose, pretending 

 to be that which it is not. 



The ACTING CHAIRMAN. Of course you do not desire to reflect on the 

 gentlemen at the other end of the Capitol who have passed the bill? 



Mr. GARDNER. Not at all, because one of the representatives of the 

 gentlemen at the other end of the Capitol has this morning expressed 

 exactly what we claim makes the bill dishonest. He has expressed his 

 view and his opinion that it is a bill to prevent the competition of colored 

 oleo with butter, and I think that that purpose in a bill avowedly a 

 revenue bill stamps it as legally a dishonest bill. I have, of course, not 

 the slightest intention to reflect upon the motives of any person who 

 advocates the bill, but it is a bill which seeks to accomplish by indirection 

 that which Congress can not accomplish directly. 



It is avowedly a revenue measure, and in explanation of my meaning 

 I say that it is only as a revenue measure that the second section of 

 this act can be considered and passed upon by the Congress of the 

 United States. It is only upon the theory that it is a revenue measure 

 that the constitutionality of the act can be upheld by the courts of the 

 United States. 



I do not go into the question of the constitutionality of the proposed 

 act. I have felt that the act would be pronounced constitutional on 

 the same ground that other acts which imposed a tax the purpose of 

 which was really not the collection of revenue have been pronounced 

 by the courts of the United States to be constitutional. Upon the 

 same ground upon which I think that the oleomargarine act of 1886 

 has been by the circuit court pronounced constitutional, upon the 

 ground that the courts of the United States can not impugn the pur- 

 poses, motives or intentions of the legislative body. 



Upon the face of this act it is a revenue measure. The courts will 

 not say that, notwithstanding the fact that this is avowedly a revenue 

 measure, they know from any source that the purpose of the act was not 

 the collection of revenue; that it was not the intention of the legisla- 

 tive branch of the Government in passing the act to collect revenue; 

 that there is another motive lying underneath and behind it. The 

 court does not feel that it is at liberty to do that; and so it seems to 

 me that the court probably would hold to be constitutional any 

 measure which was avowedly a revenue measure. 



But, gentlemen, I say that this proposed act is not honest, in that 

 sense. The promoters of the bill are not acting sincerely, because, 

 while they claim the constitutionality of the act upon the ground that it 

 is a revenue measure, and while every one of us understands that it can 

 only be upheld upon that ground, they come here and tell you with 

 perfect frankness that that is not the purpose of the act; that the act 

 has another purpose. The author of the bill tells you this morning 

 that the purpose is not to destroy this industry, but that the purpose 

 is to prevent a fraud by enabling the States to exercise their police 

 powers, or by exercising, as in effect the bill does exercise, as I think 

 I can show in a moment, the police powers of the State for them; that 

 the purpose and intention of the act is to prevent a fraud. 



I maintain that the Congress of the United States has no more right, 



