OLEOMARGARINE. 101 



as it was sold it was removed from the premises, as was alleged and 

 proven in the Schollenberger Case. The decision of the Supreme Court 

 would undoubtedly have been the same as in the latter case. The right 

 to import from foreign countries and from other States any legitimate 

 articles of commerce and sell the same in the State into which they are 

 imported in the original packages has been recognized and sustained 

 by the Supreme Court of the United States for seventy-five years by 

 an unbroken line of decisions. In the leading cases of Gibbons v. 

 Ogden (9 Wheaton, 1), and Brown v. Maryland (12 Wheaton, 419), the 

 opinions were written by Chief Justice John Marshall, the most illus- 

 trious jurist our country has produced. In those cases the great Chief 

 Justice delivered opinions which have become classics in our jurispru- 

 dence, and no jurists who value their reputations as such will ever have 

 the temerity to assail their soundness. 



I desire to call the attention of the committee to one of the opinions 

 of Chief Justice Marshall on this subject, in 12 Wheaton, in the case 

 of Brown against Maryland. This case was decided in 1827: 



"It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding from the 

 feebleness of the Federal Government contributed more to that great 

 revolution which introduced the present system than the deep and 

 general conviction that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress. 

 It is not, therefore, matter of surprise that the grant should be as 

 extensive as the mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce 

 and all commerce among the States. To construe the power so as to 

 impair its efficacy would tend to defeat an object in the attainment of 

 which the American public took, and justly took, that strong interest 

 which arose from a full conviction of its necessity. 



; 'What, then, is the just extent of a power to regulate commerce 

 with foreign nations and among the several States? This question 

 was considered in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheat., 1), in which 

 it was declared to be complete in itself, and to acknowledge no limita- 

 tions other than are prescribed by the Constitution. The power is 

 coextensive with the subject on which it acts, and can not be stopped 

 at the external boundary of a State but must enter its interior. We 

 deem it unnecessary now to reason in support of these propositions. 

 Their truth is proved by facts continually before our eyes, and was, 

 we think, demonstrated, if they could require demonstration, in the 

 case already mentioned. 



"If this power reaches the interior of a State, and may be there 

 exercised, it must be capable of authorizing the sale of those articles 

 which it introduces. Commerce is intercourse; one of its most ordi- 

 nary ingredients is traffic. It is inconceivable that the power to 

 authorize this traffic, when given in the most comprehensive terms with 

 the intent that its efficacy should be complete, should cease at the 

 point when its continuance is indispensable to its value. To what pur- 

 pose should the power to allow importation be given, unaccompanied 

 with the power to authorize a sale of the thing imported ? Sale is the 

 object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse 

 of which importation constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingre- 

 dient, as indispensable to the existence of the entire thing, then, as 

 importation itself. It must be considered as a component part of the 

 power to regulate commerce. Congress has a right, not only to 

 authorize importation, but to authorize the importer to sell." 



