104 OLEOMARGARINE. 



and that which does belong" to commerce is within the jurisdiction of 

 the United States ; and to this limit must all the general views come, 

 as I suppose, that were suggested in the reasoning of this court in the 

 cases of Gibbons v. Ogden, Brown v. The State of Maryland, and New 

 York?;. Miln.'" 



And further, the Supreme Court, in the case of Railroad Company 

 v. Husen (95 U. S., 465), used this language: 



' ' While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary laws 

 p-nd laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property within 

 its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering- under 

 contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, etc. , from entering the 

 State; while, for the purpose of self -protection, it m&y establish quar- 

 antine and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with trans- 

 portation into or through the State beyond what is absolutely necessary 

 for its self -protection. It may not, under the cover of exerting its 

 police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or inter- 

 state commerce." 



Again, in the Bowman case the court said: 



' ' If so, it has left to each State, according to its own caprice and 

 arbitrary will, to discriminate for or against every article grown, pro- 

 duced, manufactured or sold in any State and sought to be introduced 

 as an article of commerce into any other." 



Just as this bill proposes to do. 



"If the State of Iowa may prohibit the importation of intoxicating 

 liquors from all other States it may also include tobacco or any other 

 article, the use or abuse of which it may deem deleterious. It may 

 not choose even to be governed by considerations growing out of the 

 health, comfort, or peace of the community. Its policy may be directed 

 to other ends. It may chose to establish a system directed to the pro- 

 motion and benefit of its own agriculture, manufactures, or arts of any 

 description, and prevent the introduction and sale within its limits of 

 any or of all articles that it may select as coming into competition 

 with those which it seeks to protect." 



Just as is done in this case. The court holds that that can not be 

 done. 



In view of these opinions of the Supreme Court, what is the proper 

 construction to be given to the constitutional provisions I have quoted ? 



What is the meaning of the words "imposts or duties on imports or 

 exports ? " Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion in the case of Brown 

 v. Maryland (12 Wheaton, 436), answers this question. He said: "An 

 impost or duty on imports is a custom or tax levied on articles brought 

 into a country, and is most usually secured before the importer is 

 allowed to exercise his right of ownership over them." The constitu- 

 tional provision, then, which says "no State shall, without the con- 

 sent of Congress, lay any duties on imports" means that the States 

 can not impose customs duties or taxes on imports without the consent 

 of Congress. That is all that is meant. And it is further provided 

 that the net produce of all such duties shall be for ' ' the use of the 

 Treasury of the United States." 



Is there any semblance between that authority as defined by Chief 

 Justice Marshall and the authority undertaken to be conferred by the 

 first section of the bill, which simply says that the article of oleomar- 

 garine shall be placed under the supervision of the State laws passed 

 in the exercise of their police power, which State laws, as has been 



