i ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICS 5 



I am convinced that this new method of philosophising 

 will supply such a basis in an almost perfect way, that 

 I venture to avow myself its earnest advocate. If I 

 am asked for its name, I can only say that it has been 

 called Pragmatism by the chief author of its importance, 

 Professor William James, whose recent book, The Varieties 

 of Religious Experience, so many others besides the readers 

 of philosophic literature have been enjoying. But the 

 name in this case does even less than usual to explain 

 the meaning, and as the nature of Pragmatism has been 

 greatly misunderstood, and even writers of intelligence 

 and repute have conspicuously failed to grasp it, I must 

 try to put it in a clearer light. 



And perhaps I shall best begin by mentioning a few 

 of the ways in which Pragmatism may be reached, before 

 explaining how it should, in my opinion, be defined. For 

 a considerable prejudice against it has arisen in some 

 minds by reason of the method by which Professor James 

 has approached it. 



Professor James first unequivocally advanced the 

 pragmatist doctrine in connection with what he calls the 

 Will to believe. 1 Now this Will to believe was put 

 forward as an intellectual right (in certain cases) to decide 

 between alternative views, each of which seemed to make 

 a legitimate appeal to our nature, by other than purely 

 intellectual considerations, viz. their emotional interest 

 and practical value. Although Professor James laid 

 down a number of conditions limiting the applicability of 

 his Will-to-believe, the chief of which was the willingness 

 to take the risks involved and to abide by the results of 

 subsequent experience, it was not perhaps altogether 

 astonishing that his doctrine should be decried as rank 

 irrationalism. 



Irrationalism seemed a familiar and convenient label 

 for the new doctrine. For irrationalism is a permanent 



1 He had, however, laid the foundation of his doctrine as long ago as 1879 n 

 an article in Mind. And, though the name is new, in some form or other the 

 recognition of the thing runs through the whole history of thought. Indeed, it 

 would be strange if it had been otherwise, seeing that, as we contend, the actual 

 procedure of the human mind has always been (unconsciously) pragmatist. 



