i ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICS 15 



It is a clear gain, therefore, when Pragmatism holds 

 out to us a prospect of a world that can become better, 

 and even has a distant chance of becoming perfect, 

 in a sense which we are able to appreciate. The 

 only thing that could be preferred to this would be a 

 universe whose perfection could not only be metaphysically 

 deduced, but actually experienced : but such a one our 

 universe emphatically is not. 



Hence the indetermination which, as Professor James 

 has urged, 1 Pragmatism seems to introduce into our 

 conception of the world is in the main an advantage. 

 It brings out a connexion with the ethical conception of 

 Freedom and the old problems involved in it, which I 

 cannot here consider fully. I will only say this, that 

 while determinism has of course an absolutely indefeasible 

 status as a scientific postulate, and is the only assumption 

 we can use in our practical calculations, we may yet have 

 to recognise the reality of a certain measure of indeter 

 mination. It is a peculiarity of ethics that this indeter 

 mination is forced upon it, but in itself it is probably 

 universal. In its valuation, however, I should differ from 

 Professor James : I should regard it neither as good nor 

 as ineradicable. And I should contend that our indeter- 

 minism cannot have the slightest ethical value unless it 

 both vindicates and emphasises our moral responsibility. 



And this brings me to the last point I wish to make, 

 viz. the stimulus to our feeling of moral responsibility 

 which must accrue from the doctrine of Pragmatism. It 

 contains such a stimulus, alike in its denial of a mechanical 

 determination of the world which is involved in its partial 

 determination by our action, and in its admission that 

 by wrong action we may evoke a hostile response, and 

 so provoke our ruin. But in addition it must be pointed 

 out that if every cognition, however theoretical, have 

 practical value, it is potentially a moral act. We may 

 incur indeed the gravest responsibilities in selecting the 

 aims of our cognitive activities. We may become not 

 merely wise or foolish but also good or bad by willing to 



1 Will to Believe, p. ix. 



