28 HUMANISM n 



You describe a man whom I should be eager to 

 welcome. You must bring him with you the next time 

 you come, having told him what we have discussed. 



I will if I can. 



As for your present difficulty, you need not be afraid. 

 You shall argue, with me as judge, and I will see to it 

 that Aristotle obtains no unfair advantage over you. 



You embolden me to try my best. 



I do not think that courage is what you lack. 



If I have courage, it is like yours, that which comes 

 nearest to tfiat of despair. 



I never quite despaired. 



Nor will I, though it is hard not to, to one regarding 

 the present position of philosophy. 



Aristotle is beginning to think that you are not going 

 to answer him. 



Then I will delay no longer. And first of all let me 

 say that besides the views which have been taken by you 

 and by Aristotle there seem to me to be two others, and 

 that if you have no objection, I will state them, first 

 recapitulating your own. 



I have never an objection to be instructed. 



I will begin with your own view then. It seemed to 

 me to assume that there was no real or ultimate difference 

 between the use of the reason in matters practical and 

 matters theoretical. Knowledge was one and all action 

 depended on knowledge, right action presupposing right 

 knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, was useful, and there 

 was no real opposition between the True and the Good, 

 because the True could not but be good and the Good 

 true. Nevertheless, Goodness was born of Truth rather 

 than Truth of Goodness. Have I understood you aright? 



You have put things more definitely than I did, but 

 not perhaps amiss. 



Aristotle, on the other hand, whom we have just heard, 

 clearly thinks that Truth and Goodness have nothing to 

 do with each other. 



Pardon me, there is a goodness also of Truth, and in 

 a sense speculative activity (dewpia) is also action 



